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A Wild Goose Chase: California’s Attempt to
Regulate Morality by Banning the Sale of
One Food Product
MAX SHAPIRO*
In 2004, California passed S.B. 1520, making it illegal to produce
or sell foie gras as of July 1, 2012.1 In doing so, the California
legislature joined a growing number of governments around the globe
who have taken to banning the delicacy.2 This ban will have an
immediate effect on national production of foie gras, but, more
importantly, it will have devastating implications for food production
worldwide.
This Note will articulate the legal implications of the ban both
domestically and abroad. Section I will objectively frame the ongoing
debate about the merits of foie gras farming. Section II will analyze the
California ban and discuss how it fits within the American legal system.
Section III will predict what would happen if a country that produced
and exported foie gras was to challenge California’s ban through the
World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) judicial remedies. Section IV
will discuss the potential worldwide ramifications if the WTO were to
either uphold or strike down California’s ban. Finally, Section V will
discuss what has happened in the short time since the ban has gone into
effect.

* J.D., Loyola Law School, 2013; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 2006. The author would like
to thank his family, especially his parents, Julie and Robert Shapiro, and his grandparents, Arthur
Laub, Helene Laub and Ruth Shapiro, for their neverending help and continual support and
guidance; his friends for putting up with his curmudgeonly ways during the formulation of this
note; and the various professionals in and around the restaurant industry who helped him explore
and learn about this and other food- and beverage-related topics.
1. S.B. 1520, 2003–04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004).
2. Laws & Policies, NOFOIGRAS.ORG, http://www.nofoiegras.org/legal.html (last visited
Mar. 21, 2013).
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I. AN OBJECTIVE LOOK AT THE HISTORY OF FOIE GRAS PRODUCTION
AND ITS EFFECT ON DUCKS AND GEESE
The morality of foie gras production is an extremely polarizing
issue, with passionate advocates on both sides.3 Those who oppose foie
gras say that the specific process to make foie gras is cruel and amounts
to torture.4 Those in favor of continuing foie gras production say that the
process takes advantage of naturally occurring characteristics in ducks
and geese to make a product that has no serious moral implications and
tastes delicious.5
On the worldwide scale of animal farming, the foie gras industry is
relatively small. For example, in 1996, fifteen thousand tons of foie gras
was produced in the world,6 compared to 58.3 million tons of chicken in
the same year.7 The vast majority of the world’s foie gras is both
produced and consumed in France.8 In 2003 for example, Americans
consumed 420 tons of foie gras, compared to 17,500 tons in France.9
Within the United States, there are four foie gras producers; two in
upstate New York, one in Minnesota, and one in California.10
Foie gras is French for “fat liver.”11 Producers engorge the livers of
the ducks and geese by force-feeding them in the weeks leading up to
their slaughter. This process has been in use for over four thousand
years.12 Historically, geese were used for foie gras production.13 The
Moulard duck, however, which is a cross between a female Pekin duck
and a male Muscovy,14 is currently the most commonly used bird
3. See
Patrick
Battuello,
Foie
Gras:
Misery
Served,
EXAMINER.COM,
http://www.examiner.com/animal-rights-in-albany/the-foie-gras-war (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
4. NOFOIEGRAS.ORG, http://www.nofoiegras.org (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
5. Daniel David Guémené & G. Guy, The Past, Present and Future of Force-Feeding and
“Foie Gras” Production, 60 WORLD POULTRY SCI. J. 210, 220-22 (2004).
6. Scientific Comm. on Animal Health and Animal Welfare, Welfare Aspects of the
Production of Foie Gras in Ducks and Geese, 50 (Dec. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Foie Gras Report].
7. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT FOOD OUTLOOK – JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1997 (1997),
available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/w4136e/w4136e08.htm.
8. Guémené & Guy, supra note 5, at 215 (stating that 74% of worldwide production took
place in France by 1995, which rose to 83% of worldwide production as of 2002).
9. THOMAS J. SHEPSTONE, SHEPSTONE MGMT. CO., THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF THE
NEW YORK STATE FOIE GRAS INDUSTRY 5 (2004).
10. Joshua I. Grant, Hell to the Sound of Trumpets: Why Chicago’s Ban on Foie Gras Was
Constitutional and What It Means for the Future of Animal Welfare Laws, 2 STANFORD J.
ANIMAL L. & POL’Y 52, 59 (2009).
11. Id. at 54.
12. See Guémené & Guy, supra note 5, at 211.
13. Id. at 210.
14. See
Hudson
Valley
Foie
Gras
&
Duck
Products,
http://www.hudsonvalleyfoiegras.com/index.php/about-hvfg (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
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because it “has a stronger body and esophagus [and] is more resistant to
disease.”15
The birds’ livers are enlarged through a process called gavage,
which farmers begin ten to fourteen weeks after the ducks are born.16
During gavage, a metal tube is inserted down the duck’s esophagus, and
the duck is fed pellets of corn mash through a pneumatic dispenser.17
The duck’s diet begins with 0.4 pounds of food in its first feeding, and
gradually increases over time.18 Because the diet is more than the duck
would normally consume, the chemical composition and size of the
liver changes.19 The liver undergoes steatosis, which means that it
retains increased levels of fat, and grows to become much larger.20 The
average foie gras liver weighs 982 grams, while a normal duck liver
weighs seventy-six grams.21 Then, the ducks are slaughtered, butchered,
and sold part by part.22 Every part of the duck is usable. The liver is the
most prized and expensive, but producers such as Hudson Valley Foie
Gras in upstate New York sell the duck’s feathers, breast and leg meat,
and rendered duck fat.23
There is debate as to whether the ducks suffer as a result of the
forced feeding. Some claim that force-fed ducks suffer pain from the
process and become diseased as a result of their enlarged livers.24 Also,
they argue that force-fed birds suffer because of their decreased
mobility.25 Finally, opponents of foie gras production point to a higher
mortality rate for ducks and geese that are force-fed than those that are
not.26
On the other hand, some studies suggest that the ducks’ natural
physiology allows them to weather the force-feeding process, and that
the steatosis in the ducks’ liver is fully reversible.27 Even while the liver
15. Grant, supra note 10, at 60.
16. See Guémené & Guy, supra note 5, at 214.
17. Id. at 213.
18. Grant, supra note 10, at 61.
19. Foie Gras Report, supra note 6, at 39.
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. Nick Ravo, A Cornucopia of Native Foie Gras, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 1998),
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/24/nyregion/cornucopia-native-foie-gras-partners-effortsproduce-menu-delicacy-abundance.html?pagewanted=print&src=pm.
23. Id.
24. See About Foie Gras, NOFOIEGRAS.ORG, http://www.nofoiegras.org/about.html (last
visited Mar. 21, 2013).
25. Foie Gras Report, supra note 6, at 61.
26. Id. at 49 (“The mortality rate in force fed birds varies from 2% to 4% in the two week
force feeding period compared with around 0.2% in comparable ducks.”).
27. Marshall Sella, Does a Duck Have a Soul?, N.Y. MAG. (Jun. 18, 2005), available at
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is enlarged, it still functions normally.28 The birds show less aversion to
their feeders than they do to an unknown person.29 The World Poultry
Science Association’s 2004 study concluded that “physiological
indicators of stress, nociceptive signs (signs of pain) and behavioral
responses were hardly affected by the force-feeding procedure.”30
Therefore, proponents argue that what ducks endure as a result of foie
gras production is not particularly cruel.
II. CALIFORNIA’S LAW: S.B. 1520 AND ITS LEGAL STATUS
IN THE UNITED STATES
S.B. 1520 could encounter some legal challenges from domestic
foie gras producers who want to keep selling foie gras in California.
This section will analyze the substance and history of S.B. 1520 itself.
Then, it will look at the legality of S.B. 1520 within the framework of
the Dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Finally, since
the law has potential international effects, this section will analyze how
S.B. 1520 complies with the Foreign Commerce Clause and the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
After S.B. 1520 passed through the California legislature,
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed the bill into law on September
29, 2004.31 The law “prohibit[s] a person from force feeding a bird for
the purpose of enlarging the bird’s liver beyond normal size . . .”32 It
also “prohibit[s] a product from being sold in the state if it is the result
of force feeding a bird for the purpose of enlarging the bird’s liver
beyond normal size.”33 Violating the law will result in a “$1000 per
violation per day”34 fine. Even though the Governor signed S.B. 1520 in
2004, the bill did not go into effect until July 1, 2012.35
California State Senator John Burton introduced S.B. 1520 on
February 19, 2004.36 In stating the bill’s purpose, the legislature pointed
to a number of things: that the birds have difficulty walking and
http://nymag.com/nymetro/food/features/12071 (stating that ducks have no gag reflex and their
livers have a natural propensity to expand and retract).
28. Foie Gras Report, supra note 6, at 48.
29. Guémené & Guy, supra note 5, at 218.
30. Id. at 220.
31. See Cal. S.B. 1520 at 473.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 474.
36. Hearing on S.B. 1520 Before the S. Comm. on Bus. and Professions, 2003–04 Leg., Reg.
Sess. 1 (Cal. 2004), available
at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/sen/sb_15011550/sb_1520_cfa_20040427_093828_sen_comm.html [hereinafter S.B. 1520 Hearing].
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breathing; that many other countries ban the practice; that forced
confinement causes behavioral problems for the birds; that “normal
exploratory behavior” of the birds is thwarted; that the birds are under
stress; and that the birds cannot “interact socially in a normal manner.”37
Not only will this ban criminalize production in California, but it
will have negative consequences for the rest of the United States’ foie
gras industry as well. The foie gras industry in New York alone
employs 488 people and generates $23.1 million in economic output.38
An outright ban in California, the country’s most populous state, will
surely have an impact on that production. California is also considered
by many to be “the epicenter of the American food scene . . . [and]
where eating trends are born . . .”39 Therefore, the California ban will
most certainly produce effects that will be felt beyond the state’s
borders.
A. Illinois Restaurant Association v. City of Chicago
and the Dormant Commerce Clause
Less than seven months after S.B. 1520 was signed into law, the
city of Chicago followed California’s lead and introduced an ordinance
banning any “food dispensing establishment” from selling foie gras.40
The law was passed on April 26, 2006,41 and went into effect ninety
days later.42
Not long after its passage, the Chicago ban was challenged by the
Illinois Restaurant Association in federal court.43 They claimed that the
ordinance violated the Illinois state constitution as well as the
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.44 However, the case was
dismissed for the plaintiffs’ failure to state a sufficient claim.45
Given the similarity between the Chicago and California bans, the
court’s analysis in addressing the Restaurant Association’s Commerce
Clause claim is particularly useful for analyzing the constitutionality of
37. Id. ¶¶ 4–10. See also Cal. S.B. 1520, ¶¶ 4–9.
38. SHEPSTONE, supra note 9, at 1.
39. Baylen J. Linnekin, The “California Effect” & the Future of American Food, 13 CHAP.
L. REV. 357 (2010).
at
40. CHICAGO, ILL. MUN. CODE § 7-39-002 (2006), available
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Illinois/chicago_il/municipalcodeofchicago?f=templates
$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:chicago_il (repealed 2008).
41. Grant, supra note 10, at 65.
42. CHICAGO, ILL. MUN. CODE § 7-39-003 (2006).
43. See generally Illinois Restaurant Assoc. v. Chicago, 492 F. Supp. 2d 891 (N.D. Ill.
2007).
44. Id. at 893.
45. Id.

32

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 35:27

the California ban. The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power
“[to] regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states.”46 While it is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, the
courts have long recognized that the Commerce Clause also creates an
implied limitation on states’ ability to burden interstate commerce.47
Generally, courts follow a two-step approach.48 First, if the law
discriminates against interstate commerce so that it acts as a
protectionist measure for in-state commerce, the law is per se invalid.49
However, “if a law indirectly affects interstate commerce and regulates
evenhandedly,” the court must “examine whether the State’s interest is
legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly
exceeds the putative local benefits.”50 According to Pike v. Blue Church,
Inc., once the legislation is found to have “a legitimate local purpose . . .
then the question becomes one of degree.”51 Second, the inquiry looks at
the “extent of the burden” on interstate commerce, the “nature of the
local interest involved, and . . . whether it could be promoted as well
with a lesser impact on interstate activities.”52
The district court decision in Illinois Restaurant Association v.
Chicago determined that the Chicago ban was not protectionist by
nature.53 However, it did not conduct the second part of the usual
approach and apply Pike.54 In refusing to use the Pike standard, the
court highlighted a split in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.55
On one hand, Pike is an old standby, used “by generations of law
students” analyzing fact patterns under the dormant Commerce Clause.56
However, the Illinois Restaurant Association court followed a Seventh
Circuit decision that found it unnecessary to use Pike for laws that “are
facially neutral and ‘do not give local firms any competitive advantage
over those located elsewhere.’”57
Some advocates insist that the district court employed the correct
46. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
47. Illinois, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 897.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 897–98 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
50. Id. at 898 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). This is known
as the Pike balancing test.
51. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
52. Id.
53. Illinois, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 898.
54. Id.
55. See id. See also Grant, supra note 10, at 82.
56. Illinois, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 901–02.
57. Id. (quoting Nat’l Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir.
1995)).

2012]

A Wild Goose Chase

33

analysis.58 They argue that dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is
primarily concerned with striking down anti-competitive and
protectionist laws.59 Furthermore, they claim that Pike is only used as a
means to show protectionism, and should not be used when the law in
question is not discriminatory.60 Under this framework, if the law is not
discriminatory in any way, then the Pike balancing test should not be
used, as was the case in Illinois Restaurant Association.
The Supreme Court has not approved this strategy. The most
recent case involving the dormant Commerce Clause, Department of
Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, reaffirms the use of the traditional
approach.61 In that case, the court analyzed a Kentucky law that
involved tax exemptions for interest on Kentucky state bonds, but not
interest from other states’ bonds.62 In laying out the framework for the
dormant Commerce Clause analysis, Justice Souter said that if the law
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, it would be upheld,
unless it violates Pike.63 He noted that “[state] laws frequently survive
this Pike scrutiny . . . though not always.”64
Unhappy with the district court’s ruling, the Illinois Restaurant
Association appealed the verdict to the Seventh Circuit.65 However,
before the case could be heard, it became moot, as the Chicago ban was
repealed with a 37-6 vote by the same legislative body that had passed it
48-1 just two years before.66 Among the reasons for repeal, Chicago’s
mayor said that the ban was “the ‘silliest ordinance’ the city council
ever passed” and that they should be focused on “‘real issues’ like drug
dealing and children caught in gang crossfire.”67
If the California ban were to be challenged in court under the
dormant Commerce Clause, it is likely that a court would apply Pike,
given the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. In doing so, the court
would balance the state interest advanced by the law with the burden on
58. Grant, supra note 10, at 82.
59. See id. at 82–83.
60. Id. at 83 (citing Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986)).
61. See Dep’t of Revenue of KY v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338–39 (2008).
62. Id. at 328.
63. Id. at 338–39.
64. Id. at 339.
65. Grant, supra note 10, at 81.
66. Monica Davey, Ban Lifted, Foie Gras Is Back on the Menu in Chicago, N.Y. TIMES
(May 15, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/15/us/15liver.html?_r=1.
67. Dan Mihalopolous, Foie Gras Wars: How the Chicago Ban Got Passed, CHI. TRIB.
(Mar. 16, 2009), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-03-16/news/0903150177_1_foie-grasaldermen-mayor-richard-daley.
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interstate commerce. California’s interest in passing the ban was to
protect animal welfare and prevent unnecessary cruelty.68 The ban will
burden interstate commerce in that foie gras will no longer be made in
California, which will decrease overall supply. Furthermore, California
will no longer import foie gras from other states or countries, which will
have negative impacts on the foie gras producers in New York and
Minnesota. Because the Pike test is generally deferential to state
legislatures,69 and the state benefit is not clearly outweighed by the
burden on interstate commerce, the ban would likely pass the Pike test
and be upheld by the courts.
B. Foreign Impact: Legality Under the Foreign Commerce Clause
The dormant Commerce Clause is not the only constitutional
hurdle that the California ban would have to overcome. There are two
clauses in the Constitution that the ban might also violate. First, as
stated earlier, the Commerce Clause gives Congress the exclusive
power “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”70 Next, the
Supremacy Clause states that “all Treaties made . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land”.71 The California ban could violate one or
both of these provisions.
The rarely invoked Foreign Commerce Clause gives Congress
greater power over foreign commerce than it has over domestic
interstate commerce.72 This is to establish national uniformity when it
comes to foreign trade.73 As a result, “[the] Supreme Court imposes
tighter restrictions on state legislation under the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause than under the dormant Interstate Commerce
Clause.”74 The landmark Foreign Commerce Clause case, Japan Line
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, struck down a state tax on Japanese
shipping vessels as an infringement on Congress’s power to regulate
foreign commerce.75 In its opinion, the Court described a need for the
federal government to “speak with one voice when regulating
commercial relations with foreign governments.”76 This case found new
“negative implications of Congress’ power” under the Foreign
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See generally S.B. 1520 Hearing, supra note 36.
See Davis, 553 U.S. at 1808.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 960 (2010).
Id.
Id. at 966. (citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of LA, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979)).
See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448.
Id. at 449.
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Commerce Clause.77 In other words, since regulating foreign trade is
wholly within the ambit of the Federal government’s power, the Foreign
Commerce Clause acts as a barrier to forbid states from legislating in
this area.
Since Japan Line, there have only been a handful of Supreme
Court cases that have dealt with the Foreign Commerce Clause, but they
have chipped away at its scope. In Container Corp. of America v.
Franchise Tax Board, the court distinguished “between state regulations
that merely have ‘foreign resonances’ and those that ‘implicat[e] foreign
affairs,’”78 and only applied the Foreign Commerce Clause to the
latter.79 Furthermore, the Court limited the clause's applicability by
narrowly defining a measure that “implicates foreign affairs”.80
Recently, the Court has been more likely to use “positive
preemption through congressional action [rather than] the dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause” to strike down state laws that interfere with
foreign commerce.81 It is unclear what constitutes governmental action
sufficient to preempt a state law.82 On one hand, “the preemptive force
of [an] executive agreement” is enough to overrule a conflicting state
law,83 but on the other, a state law will be upheld where there is “no
‘specific indications of congressional intent’ to bar the state action
challenged.”84
Here, there is no federal governmental action that directly conflicts
with the California ban. Congress has been silent on the foie gras issue.
The Animal Welfare Act, which Congress passed in 1966, excludes
animals that are used for farming.85 The act specifically allows states to
“retain the responsibility of protecting farm animals.”86 Thus, there is no
indication that Congress intended to bar any state from passing a foie
gras ban.

77. Id.
78. Leanne M. Wilson, The Fate of the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause After
Garamendi and Crosby, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 746, 757 (2007) (quoting Container Corp. of
America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983)).
79. Id. at 758.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 762 (citing Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000)).
82. Id. at 763.
83. Id. at 765 (citing Am. Ins. Ass’n. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003)).
84. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 512 U.S. 298, 324 (1994).
85. 7 U.S.C. 54 § 2132(g).
86. Lesley Peterson, Talkin’ ‘Bout a Humane Revolution, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 265, 267
(2010).
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C. Potential Preemption: Legality Under the Supremacy Clause
The Supremacy Clause could also operate to make the California
ban illegal. According to the Supremacy Clause, any law that conflicts
with a treaty made under the authority of the United States is preempted
by that treaty.87 On January 1, 1995, the United States acceded to be a
part of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”),88 the international
organization created by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”).89 Since the United States is a party to that treaty, it follows
that any conflicting state law would be presumptively invalid.
Article XI of GATT states that “[no] prohibitions or restrictions . .
. shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the
importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting
party”.90 If the ban violates Article XI, then it would place the United
States in breach of a treaty, and thus be preempted.
However, this ban on the foie gras trade would still be legal if it
falls under one of GATT’s exceptions under Article XX, as discussed
below.91 Ultimately, if the ban does not meet the requirements of Article
XX, then it violates GATT, and would be illegal under the Supremacy
Clause. However, if it falls under Article XX’s reach, then it does not
violate GATT or, by extension, the Supremacy Clause.
III. HOW THE WTO WOULD ADJUDICATE A COMPLAINT BASED
ON CALIFORNIA’S BAN
S.B. 1520 could have a negative effect on international trade. This
section will analyze what could happen if another foie gras producing
country challenged the United States under the WTO rules based on the
California ban being a violation of GATT. First, it will briefly outline
the historical background of both the WTO and GATT. Next, there will
be a discussion of the parts of GATT that are relevant to international
free trade – those that another country would use to challenge S.B.
1520. Finally, this section will take a comprehensive look at Article
XX, which lays out the general exceptions that are allowed in GATT. It
will analyze whether S.B. 1520 could be considered a law that is
87. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
88. Trade Profiles, United States, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Oct. 2011),
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=US.
89. Understanding the WTO: Who We Are, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2012),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm [hereinafter Understanding
the WTO: Who We Are].
90. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194,
art. XI, § 1 [hereinafter GATT].
91. See id. art. XX.

2012]

A Wild Goose Chase

37

necessary to benefit public morals or animal welfare.
GATT is a multilateral treaty that has been in effect since 1948.92
Originally, GATT provided an international system of rules that
governed trade between countries.93 In order to further encourage and
facilitate free trade, GATT has been modified through rounds of
negotiations every few years since its inception.94 The most recent
round, which took place in Uruguay, resulted in the most significant
changes to date; it created a comprehensive international trade dispute
settlement body: the WTO.95
The goal of the WTO is to encourage and stimulate trade between
countries by creating a comprehensive multilateral trading system.96 It
does this by setting up a framework that follows a number of principles
designed to promote more robust trade: trade without discriminating
between countries; gradually bringing about free trade; creating
predictability between trading partners within the system; promotion of
fair competition; and the encouragement of development and economic
reform.97
Besides being an entity that codifies international trade rules,
members also rely on the WTO to settle trade disputes and negotiate
trade agreements with each other.98 In a nutshell, the WTO is an
organization “where member governments go, to try to sort out the trade
problems they face with each other.”99
As “the central pillar of the multilateral trading system,” the WTO
provides its members with a comprehensive system for dispute
resolution.100 The disputes are settled in stages overseen by the Dispute
Settlement Body, which applies and interprets WTO law.101
Before any formal judicial action occurs, the disputing countries
are encouraged to discuss the issue to see if they can resolve it
themselves or with the help of mediation by the WTO director92. Understanding the WTO: Basics, What Is the World Trade Organization?, WORLD
TRADE ORG. (2012), http://wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Understanding the WTO: Basics, Principles of the Trading System, WORLD TRADE
ORG. (2012), http://wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm.
98. Understanding the WTO: Basics, What is the World Trade Organization?, supra note
91.
99. Id.
100. Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, A Unique Contribution, WORLD TRADE
ORG. (2012), http://wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm.
101. Id.
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general.102 If that fails, the case goes to a panel, where each party
presents their case.103 Afterwards, the panel makes final rulings or
recommendations.104 Finally, if a party is unhappy with the ruling of the
panel, it can make an appeal to the WTO Appellate Body, which can
uphold, modify, or reverse the panel.105
Any member of GATT can bring a case against a second member
when they think the second member has violated the treaty.106 In
response to the California foie gras ban, the United States could find
itself being challenged by France, Canada, or any other country that
exports foie gras into the United States. Even though California is not
an independent party to GATT, it is a territorial unit of the United
States, so its legislative actions create liability for the United States as a
whole.107
A. Article XI Analysis
A complaint lodged against the United States would argue that the
California ban violates Article XI of GATT. Article XI, as stated above,
“prohibits countries from imposing quantitative restrictions on
imports.”108 A trade restriction or tariff will generally not violate GATT
unless it is seen as a protection for that country’s “like” product.109
However, a ban on a particular good violates article XI regardless of
whether or not that good is “produced domestically or imported from
any country besides the one in question.”110
A leading WTO case on trade restrictions is United States—
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (“Tuna-Dolphin I”). At issue was a
U.S. ban on tuna caught by Mexican fishing vessels equipped with nets
that were hazardous to dolphins.111 In that case, the WTO panel found
that the restriction violated article XI of GATT, because GATT forbids
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 56th Sess., [2004] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 40, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4 (St)R.A./2004/Add.1.
108. Robert Galantucci, Compassionate Consumerism Within the GATT Regime: Can
Belgium's Ban on Seal Product Imports Be Justified Under Article XX?, 39 CAL. W. INT’L. L.J.
281, 286 (2008–2009).
109. Edward Thomas, Note, Playing Chicken at the WTO: Defending an Animal WelfareBased Trade Restriction Under GATT’s Moral Exception, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 605,
613–14 (2007).
110. Id. at 614.
111. Panel Report, United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 52, WT/DS29/R (June 16,
1994) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin II].
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quantitative restrictions on imports.112 The United States did not ban all
tuna, nor did it ban all fish from Mexico; it only banned those tuna that
had been caught in a specific way.113 However, the panel still found that
this was an impermissible barrier to free trade.114
The California ban would meet a similar fate under WTO scrutiny.
It bans all foie gras, regardless of where it comes from. This is a more
restrictive trade constraint than the ban on Mexican tuna caught with
non-dolphin safe nets. Therefore, a WTO panel would almost certainly
find that California’s ban on foie gras violates GATT article XI.
B. Can California Find an Exception Under Article XX?
A finding that a country’s trade restriction violates article XI does
not end the inquiry into the legality of that restriction. If a country is
found to violate a provision of GATT, they “may seek to defend it
under the General Exceptions set out in Article XX.”115 Article XX
partially reads:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any contracting party of measures: (a) necessary to protect public
morals; [or] (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
116
health . . .

The Article XX inquiry has two parts: it first attempts to find a
particular exception that the restriction falls under; then it asks whether
the restriction satisfies the introduction to the Article, the “chapeau.”117
Another consideration to keep in mind is that the Appellate Body sees
Article XI rights as fundamental substantive rights, but it does not
afford Article XX rights the same level of deference.118 As a result,
panels interpret Article XX exceptions “narrowly, in a manner that
preserves the basic objectives and principles of the General

112. Id. at 51.
113. Id. at 4.
114. Id. at 51.
115. Peter Stevenson, The World Trade Organization Rules: A Legal Analysis of Their
Adverse Impact on Animal Welfare, 8 ANIMAL L. 107, 121 (2002).
116. GATT, supra note 90, art. XX.
117. Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Refomulated and Conventional
Gasoline, 22, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter U.S.-Gasoline].
118. Thomas, supra note 109, at 617–18.
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Agreement.”119
1. Article XX(a): The Public Morals Exception
The first issue is whether the California ban is “necessary to
protect public morals.”120 There is very little WTO jurisprudence on
Article XX(a), also known as the public morals exception.121 However,
faced with an Article XX(a) issue, a panel would use a similar analytical
framework to that used with other Article XX exceptions.122 Thus, a
WTO case analyzing Article XX(g), a GATT exception for conserving
natural resources, would contain the framework a panel would likely
use for Article XX(a).
In United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, (hereinafter “U.S.-Gasoline”), the Appellate Body used a
three-part test to determine if the disputed regulation fell within an
Article XX(g) exception.123 They looked at: (1) whether the regulation
was within the scope of the exception; (2) whether it was “necessary” to
fulfill the policy goals of that exception; and (3) whether it was a
violation of the chapeau’s ban on trade discrimination or
protectionism.124 Therefore, using the framework from U.S.-Gasoline, a
panel would likely use the following analysis for Article XX(a): (1)
whether it regulates a "public moral", (2) whether it is “necessary” to
protect that moral, and (3) whether it complies with the chapeau.125
According to the panel in United States – Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (hereinafter
“U.S.-Gambling”),126 public morals “can vary in time and space,
depending upon a range of factors, including prevailing social, cultural,
ethical and religious values.”127 The U.S.-Gambling panel argued that
countries should be given some flexibility to come up with their own

119. Panel Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 54, WT/DS29/R (June
16, 1994) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin II].
120. GATT, supra note 90, art. XX.
121. Peterson, supra note 86, at 284.
122. Thomas, supra note 109, at 620.
123. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, 12–22, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter U.S.-Gasoline]
(describing their analysis for issues arising under Article XX(g)).
124. Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT’L. L. 689, 729
(1998).
125. Thomas, supra note 109, at 620.
126. Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling
and Betting Services, ¶ 6.461, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Panel Report].
127. Id.
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definitions of “public morals.”128 In this case, the panel defined “public
morals” as a term that “denotes standards of right and wrong conduct
maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation.”129 Traditional
subjects of moral regulation in the past have included the slave trade,
drugs and alcohol, and obscene materials.130 In U.S.-Gambling, the goal
of the legislation was “the prevention of underage gambling and the
protection of pathological gamblers.”131 Ultimately, the panel decided
that this goal “could fall within the scope” of the public morals
exception.132
It should be noted that the dispute in U.S.-Gambling fell under the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”), not GATT.133
However, GATS Article XIV, which was at issue in U.S.-Gambling,
and Article XX of GATT, are similar enough that a panel would use the
same analytical framework.134 Furthermore, interpretations by previous
GATT Appellate Bodies were valid under GATS as well.135 Therefore,
logic would dictate that any GATT adjudication could look to GATS
jurisprudence in a similar fashion.
For the second prong of the analysis, a measure must be necessary
to be valid. The Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled
and Frozen Beef (hereinafter “Korea-Beef”)136 appellate body defined
“necessary” as not only “that which is ‘indispensable’ or ‘of absolute
necessity’ or ‘inevitable’” but it also includes “a range of degrees of
necessity.”137 The standard requires balancing how much the law is
tailored to meet the goals of the law, “the importance of the common
interests or values protected by that law . . . and the accompanying
impact of the law . . . on regulation on imports or exports.”138 In more
concrete terms, necessity is based on how much the measure affects
other nations (how outwardly directed the measure is), as well as
whether the restricting country has attempted to implement less trade128. Id.
129. Id. ¶ 6.465.
130. See Charnovitz, supra note 124, at 710–12.
131. Panel Report, supra note 126, ¶ 6.469.
132. Id. ¶ 6.474.
133. Id. ¶ 6.461.
134. Id.
135. Id. ¶ 6.452.
136. Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and
Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Korea-Beef].
137. Id. ¶ 161.
138. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 6.476-6.477, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005)
[hereinafter U.S.-Gambling] (quoting Korea-Beef, supra note 136, ¶ 164–66).
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restrictive alternatives.139
The appellate body in Korea-Beef found that the Korean practice
requiring imported beef to be kept distinct from domestic beef violated
GATT.140 Korea’s goal in implementing this practice was to eliminate
fraudulent sales of imported beef, but the Appellate Body did not view
this practice as “necessary.”141 The panel and Appellate Body both
found that Korea had not explored alternative means of achieving the
desired ends.142 The Korean government could effectively minimize
fraud by leveling fines or requiring beef sellers to keep records of their
transactions, rather than requiring separate sales of imported beef.143
Therefore, the measures in place were not “necessary” to prevent
fraudulent practices.144
In the case of S.B.1520, California would argue that foie gras
production is a cruel practice, and banning it is necessary to protect
public morals. If a panel were to analyze this claim under Article XX(a)
according to past WTO jurisprudence, it may find that California has a
valid argument.
The panel would first have to determine whether the foie gras ban
protects public morals. They would look to see if the public has a
general interest in animal welfare and whether the production of foie
gras implicates California’s standards of right or wrong.
As to the first inquiry, a panel would find that animal welfare is
something that has been regulated for decades.145 Therefore, the scope
of Article XX(a) would presumably include animal welfare as a public
moral.146 Furthermore, as shown in U.S.-Gasoline, panels are deferential
to legislatures when determining whether a regulation implicates public
morals.147
On the other hand, a good argument can be made for excluding
animal welfare from the scope of Article XX(a). A treaty must be
interpreted first by looking at the ordinary meaning of its words and

139. Thomas, supra note 109, at 621; see also Appellate Body Report, European
Communities – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products – Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/RRW (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter
E.C.-Asbestos].
140. See Korea-Beef, supra note 136.
141. Id. ¶ 179.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Charnovitz, supra note 124, at 712.
146. Id. at 729–30.
147. U.S.-Gambling, supra note 138, ¶ 6.461.
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second by the context of those words.148 Article XX(a)’s words are
unrevealing; they could be interpreted as being either broad and
deferential to legislative whim, or narrow and only to be used in
extreme or obvious circumstances.149 Here, it is insightful to look at the
context of Article XX(a), specifically in light of the other exceptions
explored within this article.
Article XX(b), to be discussed subsequently, allows trade
restrictions in order to protect animal life or health.150 Issues involving
animal welfare seem to fit easily into Article XX(b). Thus, “assuming
that every section of Article XX is supposed to have its own
independent meaning, one could argue that the scope of section (a) does
not include measures which fall under section (b).”151 S.B. 1520
illustrates this perfectly; according to the legislature, the motivation for
passing S.B. 1520 was really to protect the health of the birds being
raised for foie gras, not to protect the public.152
Overall, because there has not been any GATT adjudication based
on Article XX(a), there is no decisive precedent. There are persuasive
arguments on both sides as to whether force-feeding ducks and geese
would be found to implicate public morals. Therefore, it is unclear
whether or not S.B. 1520 would fall within Article XX(a)’s exception.
Whether a ban is necessary to safeguard those public morals is
another difficult issue. First, it is important to note that the regulation is
not directed outwardly; it does not ask foie gras producing countries to
stop their practices, it just bars them from exporting to California. Next,
it is unlikely that there are any less trade-restrictive alternatives.
S.B.1520 specifically bans “force feeding a bird for the purpose of
enlarging the bird’s liver beyond normal size;”153 it does not ban foie
gras per se. Furthermore, at this point in time, foie gras cannot be
produced without force-feeding. If a country wanted to prevent that
specific form of animal cruelty, it could not allow any foie gras.154 Thus,
proponents of S.B. 1520 would argue that the ban is narrowly tailored to
the goal of protecting the public morality against the cruelty of foie gras
148. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31.1–31.2, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
149. See Christoph T. Feddersen, Focusing on Substantive Law in International Economic
Relations: The Public Morals of GATT’s Article XX(a) and “Conventional” Rules of
Interpretation, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 75, 106–07 (1998).
150. GATT, supra note 90, art. XX(b).
151. Feddersen, supra note 149, at 108.
152. S.B. 1520 Hearing, supra note 136, at 41 (claiming in the purpose section of the bill that
the practice of force feeding was detrimental to the birds’ health).
153. Id.
154. Foie Gras Report, supra note 6, at 53.
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production.
Foie gras producers, however, would argue that S.B. 1520 is
underinclusive and arbitrary. A more in-depth discussion will follow in
Part IV, but if the legislature is truly trying to protect the public from
the evils of animal cruelty, foie gras is a poor choice to do it with. There
are farming practices involving other animals that are equally, if not
more, cruel to animals than foie gras farming. Also, foie gras production
is inconsequential, compared to the chicken or beef trade, which are
both rife with inhumane practices. Thus, foie gras production should be
relatively low on the list of priorities for those whose goal is stopping
inhumane farming practices.
2. Article XX(b): The Animal Welfare Exception
Proponents of S.B. 1520 would also argue that the ban falls within
Article XX(b)’s exception that allows WTO members to pass measures
to protect animal life or health. Article XX(b) jurisprudence has been
shaped by two cases involving dolphin-safe tuna fishing.155 In both
cases, the United States sought to ban non-dolphin safe tuna under
Article XX(b), which allows free trade exceptions to protect animal
life.156 The Tuna-Dolphin II panel used a three-step approach to decide
if the regulation fell within Article XX(b), just like the U.S.-Gasoline
panel did for Article XX(a)—whether: (1) the policy is directed at
protecting animal life or health; (2) the measure invoked to fulfill that
policy is actually “necessary”; and (3) whether the measure is consistent
with the chapeau of Article XX.157
For the first step, the panel in Tuna-Dolphin I looked to the
legislative history of Article XX(b) and decided that its focus was to
enable countries to pass “sanitary measures to safeguard life or health of
humans, animals or plants within the jurisdiction of the importing
country.”158 Even though protecting the lives of dolphins is within the
general purview of Article XX(b), in that it seeks to protect animal life,
the fact that the U.S. was trying to regulate outside of its own territory
made the legality of its regulations unclear.159 Allowing a country to
create a policy that has extraterritorial effects is dangerous and
potentially destructive to the GATT system. Ultimately, the panel found
that the United States did not have the ability to regulate activities
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 119; see generally Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 111.
Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 119, at 54.
Id. at 54–55.
Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 111, at 45.
Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 119, at 54.
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involving dolphins that were in Mexican waters.160
Like the dolphin-protecting regulation in the Tuna-Dolphin cases,
S.B. 1520 deals with animal health, in that it tries to protect ducks and
geese from being force-fed. However, there is a critical difference in
that the dolphin measure sought to protect wild animals, whereas S.B.
1520 looks to protect farm animals that are raised for slaughter.161 This
is an area that is traditionally outside the purview of animal cruelty
laws.162 As an example, “the U.S. [sic] [has] federal laws purporting to
protect the welfare of all animals, but these laws specifically exempt
farmed animals from their protection.”163 Furthermore, most states in the
United States have animal cruelty laws that exempt agricultural
practices.164 There is a difference between regulating to protect the
environment and regulating the farming industry.
Additionally, Article XX(b) has been interpreted to protect animal
life and health, but has never been extended to protect animal welfare.165
In practice, this exception is used “to prevent the spread of diseases or
to ensure the safety of food products for humans,166 not to protect animal
rights.167 Thus, the intent of Article XX(b) was to protect human beings,
not the animals who are raised to feed them.
However, unlike the U.S. tuna fishing regulation, S.B. 1520 does
not attempt to change how foie gras producers make their product.
Since foie gras cannot be made without force-feeding, the bill bans all
foie gras from California.168 In the Tuna cases, the U.S. policy attempted
to pressure the Mexican fishermen into using more animal-friendly
methods. This is different because the goal of the foie gras ban is not to
change how foie gras is made, but simply to keep foie gras from
entering into the state. Therefore, S.B. 1520 does not attempt to legislate
extra-jurisdictionally.
Article XX(b) also requires that the regulation be necessary. In
order to determine the meaning of necessary, it is unclear whether a
160. Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 119, at 57.
161. See Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 111; see also Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 119; see also
Cal. S.B. 1520.
162. Peterson, supra note 86, at 281 (citing Mariann Sullivan & David J. Wolfson, What’s
Good for the Goose . . . The Israeli Supreme Court, Foie Gras, and the Future of Farmed
Animals in the United States, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (2007)).
163. Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. §2132(g)(3)).
164. DAVID FAVRE, ANIMAL LAW: WELFARE, INTERESTS, AND RIGHTS 288 (2011).
165. Thomas, supra note 109, at 618, see also Peterson, supra note 86, at 281.
166. Thomas, supra note 109, at 618; see also Stevenson, supra note 115, at 136.
167. Peterson, supra note 86, at 280–81.
168. See Cal. S.B. 1520; see also HCJ 9232/01 Noah v. Att’y General PD 215, 223 [2002–
2003] (Isr.).
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panel would follow the Tuna-Dolphin cases, since they also deal with
Article XX(b), or the Korea-Beef decision, which is more recent but
resolves an issue involving Article XX(d).
As discussed earlier, the Korea-Beef decision defines “necessary”
in broad strokes, considering a wide range of circumstances as being
“necessary.”169 The Tuna-Dolphin II panel, on the other hand, was
influenced by the 1990 opinion in Thailand – Restrictions on
Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes (hereinafter “ThailandCigarettes”) in determining Article XX’s meaning of “necessary,”
which said:
[A] contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with
another GATT provision as “necessary” in terms of Article XX(d) if
an alternative measure which it could reasonably be expected to
employ and which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is
available to it. By the same token, in cases where a measure
consistent with other GATT provisions is not reasonably available, a
contracting party is bound to use, among the measures reasonably
available to it, that which entails the least degree of inconsistency
170
with other GATT provisions.

At first glance, this seems like a more restrictive definition of
“necessary” than the one given in Korea-Beef. It does allow some
wiggle room, however, by its liberal use of the term “reasonably.” Thus,
even under the Thailand-Cigarettes standard, in order to show
compliance, a GATT member would only need to show that it acted
reasonably in adopting the measures that violate GATT.
Because of the deference given to those who raise animals for
food, however, the United States would probably not be able to justify
the foie gras ban as “necessary” to protect animal life or health, as far as
GATT is concerned.
3. Satisfying Article XX’s Chapeau
The last step in the analysis under both Article XX(a) and XX(b) is
to decide whether the measure violates the chapeau of Article XX.171
The leading case on Article XX’s chapeau is the appellate body’s
opinion in United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and

169. Korea-Beef, supra note 135, at 161.
170. Panel Report, United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, L/6439-36S/345
(Jan. 16, 1989).
171. See Thomas, supra note 109, at 623.
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Shrimp Products (hereinafter “Shrimp-Turtle I”).172
Article XX’s chapeau makes sure that “measures are not applied in
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or
[that they are] a disguised restriction on international trade.”173 In other
words, the regulation will be struck down if “the purpose of the
regulation in question is to confer a competitive advantage on the
domestic industry, or to generally restrict trade, rather than to
legitimately protect the morals of society . . .”174
In analyzing the chapeau’s requirements, the Shrimp-Turtle I
appellate body noted that the chapeau has to be followed in conjunction
with a specific section of Article XX.175 Just because a measure’s policy
goal is consistent with one of the Article XX exceptions does not mean
that it will necessarily comply with the chapeau.176 A measure that does
not comply with a specific Article XX exception cannot be justified
even if it satisfies the chapeau.177 By the same token, a measure that
does not satisfy the chapeau is invalid even if it falls within an
exception.178
In general, the chapeau “embodies the recognition on the part of
WTO Members of the need to maintain a balance of rights and
obligations between the right of a Member to invoke one or another of
the exceptions . . . on one hand, and the substantive rights of the other
Members . . . on the other hand.”179 Members can invoke the exceptions,
but this should be done sparingly so as not to downgrade the
effectiveness of the treaty system as a whole.180 Essentially, the
exceptions should be limited, conditional, and, most importantly, only
invoked in good faith.181
Additionally, the trade-restricting nation cannot engage in
“arbitrary
or
unjustifiable
discrimination.”182
Unjustifiable
discrimination occurs when a country treats WTO members differently

172. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle I].
173. GATT, supra note 90, art. XX(b).
174. Thomas, supra note 109, at 56.
175. See Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 172, at 56.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. Id. at 60.
180. See id.
181. Id. at 61–62.
182. Id. at 57.
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from each other, as was the case in Shrimp-Turtle I.183 The measure in
the Shrimp-Turtle cases violated the chapeau because “exporting
members [of shrimp to the United States] were faced with ‘a single,
rigid and unbending requirement’ to adopt essentially the same policies
and enforcement practices as those applied to, and enforced on,
domestic shrimp trawlers in the United States.”184
In this case, Article XX’s chapeau should not pose a significant
problem for S.B. 1520, as long as it falls within an Article XX
exception. For one thing, S.B. 1520 does not leave room for different
treatment between countries. It unequivocally states that no food
product that is the result of force-feeding will be allowed into
California.185 It treats producers in foreign countries the same as
producers in the United States. While this might stifle trade, it is
certainly not a protectionist measure, disguised or otherwise, which is
really what the chapeau tries to eliminate. The bill is not trying to confer
a competitive advantage on any U.S. industry. Its goal is to eliminate
force-feeding in the United States as well as abroad. Therefore, a panel
would have no reason to invalidate S.B. 1520 on the grounds that it
violates the chapeau of Article XX.
IV. A SLIPPERY SLOPE: WHY BANNING FOODS FOR MORAL PURPOSES
COULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO WORLD TRADE
A. It is Unlikely That S.B. 1520 Would Have its Day in WTO Court
Figuring out whether or not S.B. 1520 would survive a complaint
is a nice exercise in WTO theory, but the likelihood of a country such as
France or Canada lodging a formal complaint against the United States
is low because of the small size of the foie gras trade and the small
impact that one state has on that trade.
Of the total foie gras consumption in the United States, which is
only $14.5 million, about eighty-seven percent comes from domestic
foie gras production.186 Canadian foie gras makes up six percent of U.S.
consumption, which is 25.2 tons or $870,000 worth.187 France accounts
for seven percent of U.S. consumption, which equals about 29.4 tons of
foie gras188 or $1.02 million worth.189 Since France produces about
183. Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, 35, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle II].
184. Id. at 45 (quoting Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 172, at 43) (emphasis added).
185. Cal. S.B. 1520.
186. SHEPSTONE, supra note 9, at 2.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 5.
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seventeen thousand tons of foie gras each year,190 the United States only
consumes 0.17 percent of total French foie gras produced. Thus,
California’s total consumption of foie gras is even less than 0.17
percent.
It makes little sense for either country to put in the time, effort, and
political capital to challenge S.B. 1520. Canada exports fifty-seven
thousand tons of poultry191 and over 400 thousand tons of beef per
year.192 The total meat and poultry industry accounted for $21.3 billion
in 2009.193 That makes the total revenue that would have gone to
California from Canadian foie gras producers at most 0.00004% of the
Canadian meat and poultry industry. Similarly, France exports over a
billion dollars’ worth of poultry per year.194 Total U.S. consumption of
foie gras accounts for less than one tenth of a percent of that billion
dollars. The reality is that neither country will likely feel the effects of
S.B. 1520 enough to challenge it through the WTO. However, because
of the reasoning behind S.B. 1520, and the general importance of the
meat and poultry trade worldwide, the foie gras ban sets a dangerous
precedent.
B. Arguments for Maintaining the GATT Scheme
In a broader sense, it would be dangerous for a country to be able
to impose its own morality on international trade, especially under the
free trade scheme that GATT establishes. It is true that the difference
between foie gras and chicken production is huge when considering the
worldwide value of each. However, philosophically, they are similar; in
both cases, animals are being raised so humans can eat them. Saying
that one is cruel and the other is not is simply a matter of personal
judgment. Some would say that raising any animal for food is immoral;
others might argue that animals being raised for food have no
protectable interest; and there are countless positions in between. If a
foie gras ban were upheld, future WTO panels could uphold any ban
189. See id. at 2.
190. Guémené & Guy, supra note 5, at 215.
191. Canadian Poultry and Products Annual Overview, CANADIAN POULTRY,
http://www.canadianpoultrymag.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1010&Ite
mid=142 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
192. See Industry Statistics, Canadian Livestock and Meat Industry – 2010 Industry Statistics,
CANADIAN MEAT COUNCIL, http://cmc-cvc.com/en/about-us/industry-statistics/beef-cattle (last
visited Mar. 23, 2013).
193. Id.
194. See French Poultry Press Kit, JE MANGE HALAL 6 (Feb. 2006),
http://www.jemangehalal.com/marche-du-halal/documents/poultry-presskitgb.pdf (stating that in
2004, the French poultry industry exported 983 million euros in poultry).
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based on a nebulous insistence that it was enacted to protect public
morals.
The WTO panel in Shrimp-Turtle I made an impassioned defense
of a strong version of the GATT multilateral trading system:
We are of the view that a type of measure adopted by a Member
which, on its own, may appear to have a relatively minor impact on
the multilateral trading system, may nonetheless raise a serious threat
to that system if similar measures are adopted by the same or other
Members. Thus, by allowing such type of measures even though
their individual impact may not appear to be such as to threaten the
multilateral trading system, one would affect the security and
195
predictability of the multilateral trading system.

The appellate body later overruled the panel on this issue and
toned down the rhetoric, saying that the panel interpreted GATT’s
purposes too broadly in striking down the restriction.196 The inquiry
should not look at the purposes of GATT as a whole, the appellate body
claimed; a restrictive trade measure falls within an Article XX
exception as long as it does not attempt to abuse those exceptions.197
In so ruling, the appellate body weakens GATT too much. The
beauty of GATT is in its simplicity. It protects the free flow of goods
between countries. Thus, its exceptions should be allowed narrowly in
order to maintain that free flow. Strengthening the Article XX
exceptions creates a dangerous precedent, whereby countries can easily
stifle free trade and WTO panels will have to make moral judgment
calls. This would lead to inconsistent judicial results, unevenness in the
law, and uncertainty about what a country can and cannot do.
C. The Israeli Supreme Court’s Unique Take on Foie Gras
Some would argue that S.B. 1520 is not the first step towards stateimposed vegetarianism; that the production of foie gras is unique in its
cruelty among the methods that are used to raise animals for food. In
fact, the issue was brought before the Israeli Supreme Court in a 2003
case that challenged foie gras production under Israeli animal cruelty
laws.198
The Israeli animal welfare statute says that “[a] person will not
torture an animal, will not be cruel toward it, or abuse it in any way.”199
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 172, at 40.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 43.
See HCJ 9232/01 Noah v. Att’y General PD 215 [2002–2003] (Isr.).
Id. at 222 (quoting the 1994 Protection of Animals Law, Section 2(a)).
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The case came before the Israeli Supreme Court when a number of
animal-protection groups petitioned the court to force the Minister of
Agriculture to prohibit foie gras production under that law.200
Ultimately, the court had to decide whether foie gras production could
comply with the animal welfare statute.201
The court first acknowledged that there were two different points
of view: one which views animals as property of the person that owns it,
and the other, on the opposite side of the spectrum, which believes that
animals, as living creatures, deserve the same protections as humans
have.202 Ultimately, whether an act can be considered torture, cruelty or
abuse, and therefore in violation of Israeli law, it had to be analyzed
according to a three-part test, laid out in a previous Israeli case, Let the
Animals Live v. Hamat Gader Recreation Enterprises.203 The analysis
looks at: (1) whether a reasonable person would find the act to be
torture, cruel or abuse; (2) that the animal encounters pain or suffering;
and (3) whether the pain or suffering is proportionate to the purpose for
which the animal is undergoing it.204
In the case of force-feeding, the Noah court found that the first
element was satisfied, that a normal observer would surely find that the
process constitutes torture.205 Justice Grunis of the Noah court figured
that the normal human response to seeing an animal force fed in order to
enlarge its liver would see the process as torture.206 The court also
adopted the position of the EU’s Scientific Committee on Animal
Health and Animal Welfare in their report on the production of foie
gras, which found that force-feeding ducks and geese causes
suffering.207 Lastly, the court had to determine whether “the ends justify
the means” or whether having foie gras available justified the suffering
of the ducks and geese.208
Ultimately, in a 2-1 opinion, the Court decided to ban the practice
of force-feeding.209 Justice Strasberg-Cohen wrote the opinion adopted
by the majority, in which she drew a distinction between luxury and
necessary food products.210 In her calculus, the need to produce a luxury
200.
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food item was not serious enough to balance the suffering that the ducks
and geese went through in the force-feeding process.211 Therefore, the
practice of force-feeding fell within the scope of the animal cruelty law
and was declared illegal.212
The United States also has a law dealing with animal welfare: the
Animal Protection Act. However, it deals mostly with animals used in
research facilities and those that are transported alive to be sold
elsewhere.213 Furthermore, it specifically places responsibility on the
Secretary of Agriculture to create standards that determine what
constitutes cruelty.214 Thus, it is unlikely that a court would even take a
case like the one in Israel, as it presents a separation of powers issue and
because food production falls outside of its intended purpose.
D. Looking to the Future
Lastly, even though the WTO does not protect agricultural animal
welfare with Article XX, there are signs that they may adopt more
animal-friendly measures in the future.215 Many international animal
health standards are adopted from the OIE, the World Organization for
Animal Health.216 “Beginning in 2001, the [OIE] agreed to begin a
discussion on animal welfare issues with the goal of adoption of
international standards.”217 While findings of the OIE would not become
law immediately, it would have great influence on animal welfare laws
worldwide.218
V. REACTIONS TO S.B. 1520 GOING INTO EFFECT
The California foie gras ban went into effect July 1, 2012.
However, this has not stopped Californians from eating foie gras.219 One
restaurant is still serving foie gras because it claims that the ban does
not apply to restaurants on federal property.220 Some restaurants are
serving foie gras for free, and others are preparing foie gras that
211.
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214.
215.
216.
217.
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219.
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customers bring in themselves.221 These restaurants claim they can do
this because the ban does not expressly prohibit distribution.222 There
are also practical barriers to enforcement. For example, it is unclear who
is charged with enforcing the ban. Thus, state agencies have little power
to control defiant chefs and diners because of tight budgets and unclear
statutory wording.223
Furthermore, the day the law went into effect, a lawsuit was filed
against the state of California by a Canadian association of foie gras
producers, Hudson Valley Foie Gras, and a restaurant group located in
California.224 The suit alleges that the law violates the Foreign
Commerce Clause, the Interstate Commerce Clause, and the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution.225 On July 18, 2012, the judge
hearing the case denied a temporary restraining order, but allowed the
case to move forward on the merits.226 The progress of this case is
certainly worth following.
Overall, foie gras production is a complicated and difficult issue to
make sense of, with passionate advocates on both sides. S.B. 1520 will
probably not face any significant international legal challenges. It will,
however, create discussion and encourage debate about the way we
raise food to eat, and the role of government in regulating it.
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